Fiscal Policy Disclosure in Indonesian Local Governments by Arifin, J. (Johan) et al.
13 
FISCAL POLICY DISCLOSURE IN INDONESIAN 
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 
 
Johan Arifin,  
Universitas Islam Indonesia, Curtin University Perth Australia 
e-mail: johan.smile@yahoo.com 
 
Greg Tower  
Curtin University, Perth Australia 
e-mail: G.Tower@curtin.edu.au 
 
Stacey Porter  
Curtin University, Perth Australia 
e-mail: Stacey.Porter@cbs.curtin.edu.au 
 
Abstract 
 
This study investigates the level of fiscal policy disclosure within financial statements of Indone-
sian local governments. Indonesia is a developing country that has recently undergone major state 
financial reform. Isomorphic institutional theory is adopted as the underlying theoretical frame-
work. There is a high level of communication as measured by the Fiscal Policy Compliance Index 
(81.2%). Regression analysis shows that the coercive isomorphism variable, measured by number 
of parliamentarians, is positive and statistically significant predictor of the extent of fiscal policy 
disclosure. Local governments that have more parliamentarians in their jurisdiction communicate 
more extensively. In addition, the age of local governments and financial independence variables 
affect the extent of fiscal policy disclosure in Indonesian local governments. 
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Abstrak 
 
Studi ini meneliti tingkat pengungkapan informasi kebijakan fiskal dalam laporan keuangan 
pemerintah daerah Indonesia. Indonesia adalah sebuah negara berkembang yang baru saja 
melalukan reformasi keuangan negara secara komprehensif. Teori institusional isomorphic 
diadopsi sebagai teori yang mendasari studi ini. Hasil studi ini menyatakan bahwa terdapat 
tingkat pengungkapan informasi kebijakan fiskal yang tinggi dalam laporan keuangan 
pemerintah daerah yang diukur dengan index ketaatan kebijakan fiskal yaitu 81,2%. Analisis 
regresi menunjukkan bahwa variabel ‘coercive’ yang diukur dengan jumlah anggota dewan 
merupakan prediktor terhadap tingkat pengungkapan informasi kebijakan fiskal. Pemerintah 
daerah yang mempunyai lebih banyak jumlah anggota dewan lebih intensif mengkomunikasikan 
informasi kebijakan fiskalnya. Selain itu, umur pemerintah daerah dan ketergantungan keuangan 
juga mempengaruhi tingkat pengungkapan informasi kebijakan fiskal pada pemerintah daerah 
Indonesia.  
 
Kata kunci: Laporan keuangan, pengungkapan informasi kebijakan fiskal, negara berkembang. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Indonesia is a developing country in Asia that 
has recently undergone comprehensive reform 
to improve economic conditions. Indonesia's 
economy can be measured by using several 
indicators such as national income and Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) (Suliswanto and 
Kaluge 2010). The government of Indonesia 
has a range of policies to maintain or improve 
the quality of Indonesia's economy. One key 
element is fiscal policy. According to Talvi 
and Vegh (2005) fiscal policy is made by the 
 	
 
14 
government to direct a country's economy 
through government spending and revenues 
via their budget. The budget consists of tax 
revenue, government spending, and govern-
ment transfers. Taylor (2000) states that fiscal 
policy has two main instruments, namely tax 
policy and expenditure policy to influence of 
state revenues and expenditures on the state 
economy, unemployment, and inflation.
Government has a power to collect pub-
lic revenue and shall use it to finance the activi-
ties to provide services to the public. The gov-
ernment should be accountable for such activi-
ties transparently. In order to establish account-
ability and transparency, Indonesia has issued 
Government Regulation No.24 of 2005 regard-
ing the Governmental Accounting Standards, 
and No.8 of 2006 on the Financial Reporting 
and Performance of Government Agencies. 
These apply to the central government and lo-
cal government. As required by the Indonesia 
government accounting standard, information 
on fiscal policy is a part that must be disclosed 
in financial statements across all government 
agencies, in other words information of fiscal 
policy is a mandatory disclosure. 
In UU No.22 of 1999 local govern-
ments were given authority to set their own 
appropriate regulations. This condition causes 
a high accountability for every local govern-
ment in Indonesia. In connection with the im-
plementation of government regulations (PP) 
No.24 of 2005 about the governmental ac-
counting standard, it is important to study the 
extent of local government communication. 
How do they implement the fiscal policy dis-
closure requirements in their financial state-
ment? UU No. 17 of 2003 requires for any lo-
cal governments in Indonesia to make an an-
nual financial report in accordance with appli-
cable governmental accounting standards. 
There is a clear need to research local 
government compliance. For example, in 2009 
the Supreme Audit Board of the Republic of 
Indonesia that is also known as Badan Pe-
meriksa Keuangan (BPK) claims that the finan-
cial statements of local governments in Indone-
sia have not met expected targets. The Board 
which is the highest (supreme) audit institution 
in the land is responsible for the auditing of the 
state finance sector, i.e. the budget implementa-
tions of the central government and local gov-
ernment, the state-owned enterprises, and those 
enterprises owned by the local governments in 
short, the entire wealth of the government. They 
state many Indonesian local governments have 
not fully prepared financial statement in accor-
dance with standards and regulations. Herawaty 
and Susanto (2008) argue that to obtain an un-
qualified opinion for Indonesian local govern-
ment entities, there are four criteria that need to 
be considered including: compliance with ac-
counting standards, the effectiveness of internal 
control, compliance with laws and regulations 
and the adequacy of disclosure (full disclosure). 
Table 1 highlights problems with compliance in 
Indonesian local governments. 
Several studies of mandatory disclosure 
have been made by previous researchers such 
as Martani and Lestiani (2010) which states 
that the audit findings of local government in-
fluence governmental organizations in conduct-
ing their mandatory disclosure in their financial 
statements. Moreover, they state that the num-
ber and the value of audit findings affect the 
level of disclosure in the financial statements of 
organizations. They posit the higher the num-
ber of audit findings, the lower the level of dis-
closure in the financial statements. 
 
Table 1: Financial Statement Audit Opinion: Indonesian local government 2007-2009 
 
Unqualified 
Opinions 
Qualified Opinions 
Disclaimer 
Opinions 
Adverse Opinions  
Year 
Number 
of entities 
% 
Number of 
entities 
% 
Number of 
entities 
% 
Number 
of entities 
% Total 
2007 
4 1% 
283 61% 121 26% 59 13% 467 
2008 
13 3% 
322 67% 115 24% 32 6% 482 
2009 
15 4% 
315 72% 70 16% 35 8% 435 
 Source: Supreme Audit Board of Indonesia 
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Copley (1991) investigates the influ-
ence of audit quality on the financial disclo-
sure of local governments. The result provides 
evidence that there is positive relationship be-
tween audit quality and disclosure. Research 
in the private sector has found similar results 
where audit quality can induce the financial 
statement quality by improving the disclosure 
to reduce asymmetry information. Ingram 
(1984) concludes that the coalition of voters, 
administrative powers, and management in-
centives significantly helps explain variations 
in the disclosure level on governmental finan-
cial statements. Robbins and Austin (1986) 
also note that administrative power and man-
agement incentives are associated with the 
disclosure quality. Cheng (1992) develops a 
political economic model based on the theo-
retical and empirical work in public choice 
and political science to help explain state gov-
ernment accounting disclosure choice. The 
model posits that state government accounting 
disclosure choice is influenced by its political 
environment and institutional forces. 
 This study examines key variables that 
are expected to influence the level fiscal pol-
icy disclosure of financial statements in local 
governments in Indonesia. There are two im-
portant aspects to this study. First, this re-
search uses institutional theory approach to 
examine the level of fiscal policy disclosure of 
financial statements of local governments in 
Indonesia. Second, the research is conducted 
in Indonesia, a developing country that has 
recently undergone major state financial re-
form and has a unique governmental struc-
ture
1
.
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 The territory of Indonesia is divided into autonomous prov-
inces, districts (kabupaten) and municipalities (kota).  Dis-
tricts and municipalities are technically the same level of 
government. This distinction is based on whether the gov-
ernment administration is located in a rural area (district) or 
an urban area (municipality). Within districts and munici-
palities there are sub-districts (kecamatan) which are small-
er administrative government units. Each sub-district is fur-
ther divided into villages. Villages in rural areas are called 
desa, while in an urban areas there are referred to as kelura-
han (Usman, 2001). This study focuses on the district and 
municipality levels. These are collectively referred to in this 
study as ‘local government’. 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND 
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Studies on mandatory disclosure, including 
those examining disclosures of fiscal policy 
have adopted a variety of theories such as 
agency theory (Mahoney 2005), legitimacy 
theory (Mobus 2005), capital market theory 
(Schon 2006), and institutional theory (Yoshi-
kawa, Tsui and McGuire 2007). Among these 
theories, agency theory and institutional the-
ory are the most widely used by mandatory 
disclosure researchers (Mucciarone 2008). 
Recently, some researchers have employed 
institutional theory in the public sector area 
specifically on mandatory disclosure (e.g. 
Buhr and Freedman 2001). Sejjaaka (2004) 
posits that this theory potentially provides 
greater insights of mandatory disclosure prac-
tices. Accordingly, this study adopts institu-
tional theory as the underlying theoretical 
framework explaining fiscal policy disclosure 
practices in Indonesia. 
The local government is one type of 
public sector organization whose primary pur-
pose is to provide public services. Mardiasmo 
(2002) argue that because it involves the use 
of public money then the government will get 
pressure from various parties (stakeholders) 
relating to the need for public accountability. 
The government stakeholders will continue to 
pressure local governments on the quality of 
public services and public accountability. 
Institutional theory explains that or-
ganizations are faced with institutional pres-
sures and due to these pressures those organi-
zations tend to become very similar in their 
form and practices (Perera 2007; Deegan  
2006). Institutional theory is concerned with 
how organizations structure themselves to 
gain acceptance and legitimacy which may be 
at the expense of efficiency. Legitimacy is the 
acceptance of an organization by certain social 
actors in society as not all parties have the 
standing to confer legitimacy. Pressures to 
conform arise from a variety of factors includ-
ing uncertainty and task requirements, profes-
sional norms and standards, and a broader 
normative environment (Dacin 1977).  
 	
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Institutional theory has two main di-
mensions: isomorphism and decoupling 
(Deegan 2006). Isomorphism, as used in this 
study, refers to particular practices by an or-
ganization because of institutional pressures 
(DiMaggio and Powell 1983) while decoup-
ling refers to a situation in which the apparent 
practice of an organization is different from 
the actual practice (Meyer and Rowan 1977). 
In the context of this study, it can be said that 
isomorphism is the process by which fiscal 
policy disclosure practice in a local govern-
ment is influenced by institutional pressures. 
Whereas decoupling is a situation in which 
fiscal policy disclosure practice is used by an 
organization to create an image which is dif-
ferent from that organization’s circumstances 
or activities. In accordance with the purpose 
of this research which relates to the factors 
that influence the level of mandatory disclo-
sure (fiscal policy) in local governments, this 
study solely utilises the isomorphic institu-
tional dimension as the underlying theoretical 
framework. 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983, p.149) 
label the process by which organizations tend 
to adopt the same structures and practices as 
‘isomorphism’, which they describe as a ho-
mogenization of organizations. Tolbert and 
Zucker (1983, p.17) state when describing 
municipality reform “…the rapid institution-
alization of the reform rested on the assumed 
isomorphism between it and the ideal rational 
bureaucratic form”. Several studies such as 
(Zucker 1987; Covaleski and Dirsmith 1988; 
and Tagesson and Falkman 2008) are based on 
institutional isomorphism in accordance with 
the concepts put forward by DiMaggio and 
Powel (1983). 
 As proposed by institutional theorists, 
by becoming ‘isomorphic’, organizations may 
achieve legitimacy (DiMaggio and Powell 
1983). Kostova and Zaheer (1999) note that 
institutional theory supporters such as Powell 
and DiMaggio (1983) and Meyer and Rowan 
(1977) have identified some of the determi-
nants of organizational legitimacy and the 
characteristics of the legitimating process. 
They cite three sets of factors that shape or-
ganizational legitimacy: (1) the environment’s 
institutional characteristics, (2) the organiza-
tion’s characteristics, and (3) the legitimating 
process by which the environment builds its 
perception of organizations. Furthermore, 
Kostova and Zaheer (1999, p.77) in their study 
on multinational enterprises, claim ”given the 
multiplicity and variety of institutional envi-
ronments and the cross country differences 
between these environments, achieving iso-
morphism becomes difficult”. Carpenter 
(2001) and Ashworth, Boyne and Delbridge 
(2007) suggest that isomorphic pressures dif-
fer based on organizational characteristics. In 
a consistent theme, this study examines iso-
morphic variables such as size of local gov-
ernment, jurisdiction, and political influence, 
and their potential relationship with the level 
of fiscal policy disclosure.  
Scott (1987) reviews four sociological 
formulations all claiming an institutional focus 
due to variations in definition on the concepts 
of institution and institutionalization. Scott 
(1987, p.499) describes institutionalization 
conceptions as “a process of instilling value; a 
process of creating reality; institutional sys-
tems as a class of elements and institutions as 
distinct societal spheres”. This study considers 
several areas within institutional theory, in-
cluding that describing institutional systems as 
a class of elements. According to Scott (1987, 
p.497), “institutionalized belief systems con-
stitute a distinctive class of elements that can 
account for the existence and/or elaboration of 
organizational structure”. Furthermore, he 
states that: 
 
Since the concept of institutionaliza-
tion is not definitionally linked to a 
distinctive process that might cause an 
organization to change its structure in 
ways that make it conform to-become 
isomorphic with–an institutional pat-
tern. The best known-classification is 
of this type is developed by DiMaggio 
and Powell (1983) who distinguished 
among coercive, mimetic and norma-
tive processes leading to conformity.  
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This study examines these three types 
of isomorphic pressures. Joseph (2010) re-
veals that the most noticeable type of institu-
tional force is coercive isomorphism. Accord-
ing to DiMaggio and Powell (1983, p.149), 
“coercive isomorphism results from both for-
mal and informal pressures exerted by other 
organizations on which an organization may 
be dependent, as well as cultural expectation 
in which the organizations operate”. The for-
mal pressure they refer to is a regulative proc-
ess where regulators have the capacity to set 
up rules and procedures, monitor compliance 
and, when necessary, apply sanctions.  
DiMaggio and Powell (1983, p.150) 
then explain “mimetic isomorphism is where 
organizations tend to model themselves and 
imitate the practices and policies of those or-
ganizations perceived to be legitimate and 
successful”. Mimetic isomorphism is often 
referred to as a response to uncertainty. Fur-
thermore, Baker and Rennie (2006, p.88) 
states that “while these organizations may not 
be certain about what they should do when 
facing challenges by adopting structures and 
processes used by similar organizations, they 
are, at the very least being seen to be doing 
something”.  
 Ryan and Purcell (2004, p.10) state 
that “normative influences refer to shared 
norms of organizational members, that is, 
those values that may be unspoken, or expec-
tations that have gained acceptance within or-
ganizations”. The element of pressure is nor-
mally developed by professional and occupa-
tional groups (Rahaman et al. 2004). Di-
Maggio and Powell (1983) argue that the more 
highly professionalized a workforce becomes 
in terms of academic qualifications and par-
ticipation in professional and trade associa-
tions, the greater the extent to which the or-
ganization becomes similar to other organiza-
tions in the fields. In addition, Baker and Ren-
nie (2006, p.87) also cite another source of 
normative isomorphism, expertise, as a possi-
ble important resource in “the implementation 
of reform and help in identifying shortcomings 
in a practice”.  
 
Coercive Isomorphism Related Hypothesis 
This study examines the independent variable 
size of local government within the framework 
of coercive isomorphism. Size of government 
organization has been examined previously in 
public sector accounting research as one of the 
stronger determinants of for example, choice of 
accounting standard or internet financial report-
ing. With regard to public sector accounting 
research, size of an organization has been 
found to have a positive relationship with the 
extent of disclosure in annual reports of state 
government (Taylor and Rosair 2000).  
Several studies use size of local par-
liament
2
 as a measurement of local govern-
ment size (see Hix 2004). In line with coercive 
isomorphism aspect of institutional theory, the 
local parliamentarians are thought to have the 
power to pressure local government executive 
to align with the society’s aspirations. Accord-
ingly this study uses the number of local rep-
resentatives in parliament to measure size as a 
predictor of the level of fiscal policy disclo-
sure in financial statements. 
Local Parliament has a varying number 
of parliament members, depending on the size 
and influence of the local government. As 
stated in Indonesian Act No. 10 of 2008, a 
member of local parliament is a political me-
diator of the people within a local government. 
The greater number of local parliament mem-
bers, means the greater local community rep-
resentatives who will hold a legislative func-
tion to influence local government executives 
in performing their duties (Sotiropoulos 2008). 
Therefore, there is potential pressure from 
those local members representing local com-
munity as a coercive influence of local gov-
ernment executives to make more extensive 
disclosures on their operational activities. To 
capture this potential coercive pressure the 
following hypothesis is proposed: 
H1: There is a positive association between 
size of local parliament and the extent of 
                                                 
2
 Under Act No. 27 of 2009, In Indonesia, there are three 
levels of parliament; those are state parliament, provincial 
parliament, and local parliament. This study focuses on the 
local parliament level consisting of districts and municipali-
ties members. 
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fiscal policy disclosure in the local gov-
ernment financial statements. 
 
Mimetic Isomorphism Related Hypothesis  
Within the framework of mimetic isomor-
phism, a hypothesis is developed to test the 
impact of jurisdiction. State or local govern-
ment’s jurisdiction is arguably a mimetic pres-
sure in relation to institutional theory. Di-
Maggio and Powel (1983) suggest that mi-
metic behavior occurs as a reaction to uncer-
tainty. When organizations face situations 
where there is no clear cut course of action, 
they may limit the selection of structures or 
practices to those that are being used by other 
organizations that are viewed as being suc-
cessful in the institutional environment. Fur-
thermore, Palmer (1993) states that organiza-
tions tend to model themselves after similar 
organizations in their field that are perceived 
to be more legitimate or successful. Thus, 
mimetic isomorphism is a response to organ-
izational uncertainty in identifying the best 
course of action.  
The capital city of Indonesia is located 
on the island of Java. The capital’s Java loca-
tion influences the surrounding area to get 
better facilities. Potentially the amenities in 
every local government located in Java may 
be better than non-Java. For instance, the 
government of Indonesia through the Ministry 
of Communications and Information (Kem-
kominfo) admit to having a clear gap in terms 
of construction and development of telecom-
munications facilities on the islands between 
Java and non-Java (Republika 2011). Ball 
(2001) and Olajumuke (2010) feel that the 
quality of telecommunication infrastructure 
will affect the quality of an entity's financial 
reporting. With a better communication sys-
tem, an organization can more easily monitor 
its development, all matters relating to the 
operations can be shared to all stakeholders 
more quickly to support the advancement of 
the organization. In addition, Java has better 
educational facilities than non-Java with most of 
the leading universities being located in Java. It is 
therefore suggested that non Java local govern-
ments will potentially mimic administrative prac-
tices of Java local governments, including the fis-
cal policy disclosure practices in the financial 
statements. The following hypothesis of mimetic 
behavior is proposed: 
H2: There is a positive association between 
local governments that are located on the 
island of Java and the extent of fiscal pol-
icy disclosure in the local government fi-
nancial statements as compared to non-
Java entity. 
 
 
Normative Isomorphism Related Hypothesis 
Under normative isomorphism, a hypothesis is 
developed to test the impact of a possibly ex-
planatory variable namely political influence. 
In the governance structure for public sector, 
local parliament is an institution that has an 
important check and balance function to en-
sure that the local government executives exe-
cute their job well in the interests of all stake-
holders (Lyngstad 2010). Grigorescu (2008) 
interprets this function as horizontal account-
ability. This function can be used as an argu-
ment to support normative isomorphism pres-
sure on local government executives to run the 
“professional activities” to meet the public 
interest. Moreover, Gaffikin and Lindawati 
(2012) define a professional activity as “an activity 
that has a strong motivation, sufficient knowledge, 
service oriented, and priority to public interest”. A 
leader of local government should be professional 
in doing the work and must be independent of the 
political parties which have supported him/her in 
the election. 
Meanwhile, Sopanah (2005) and Ying 
and Zhengfei (2006) state that a decline in the 
quality of supervision of the executive would 
result in decreased quality of disclosure on the 
executive accountability report, including dis-
closures on its financial statements. 
Moreover, Silva (2009) argues that the 
composition of members of local parliament 
could be used as benchmarks to see the power 
of pressure exerted by the local parliament to 
the executive government. If the proportion of 
local parliament member is dominated by the 
majority party, and the chairman of local gov-
ernment is from the same party or a coalition, 
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then the quality of supervision conducted on 
the performance of the executive may decline. 
Based on these ideas, the following hypothesis 
is proposed: 
H3: There is a positive association between 
the proportion of local parliament mem-
bers who are independent of the executive 
(chairman of the local government) and 
the extent of fiscal policy disclosure in the 
local government financial statements. 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
From a total population of 496 local govern-
ments in Indonesia, a stratified random sam-
ple
3
 of 80 financial statements is collected 
from the Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan (Su-
preme Audit Institution) database for the pe-
riod ending December 31, 2009. The sample 
consists of 40 local governments in Java and 
40 local governments outside Java. Both local 
governments’ types are further divided into 
district and municipality groupings.  
 
Measurement Techniques 
Dependent Variable 
Informativeness of financial statements can be 
seen from the extent to which an entity pro-
vides an explanation (disclosure) on financial 
its financial statements (Ingram and DeJong 
1987). In Indonesia, fiscal policy disclosure of 
local government statement is mandatory in 
accordance with the government regulation No. 
24 of 2005 regarding Indonesian Government 
Accounting Standards. To examine the extent 
of fiscal policy disclosure in financial state-
ments of Indonesian local governments, a Fis-
cal Policy Compliance Index (FPCI) is created.  
Cook (1990) states that a disclosure 
index can be classified into weighted or un-
                                                 
3
 A method of sampling that involves the division of a popu-
lation into smaller groups known as strata. In stratified ran-
dom sampling, the strata are formed based on members' 
shared attributes or characteristics. A random sample from 
each stratum is taken in a number proportional to the stra-
tum's size when compared to the population. These subsets 
of the strata are then pooled to form a type of random sam-
ple (Reynolds, Simintiras & Diamantopoulos, 2003). In this 
study, the division of strata includes district-municipality, 
old-new of local government, surplus-loss of local govern-
ment, Java and non-Java. 
weighted index. In a weighted disclosure in-
dex, particular disclosure items are given a 
higher score than the other disclosure items 
based on the perceived importance of those 
particular items. Whereas, in an unweighted 
index, each disclosure item is deemed equally 
important and therefore each item is awarded 
the same score when it is disclosed (Meek, 
Roberts and Gray 1995). Most prior studies 
use an unweighted disclosure index to meas-
ure the level of disclosure as this technique is 
considered far less subjective than a weighted 
index and is more relevant to all entities 
(Craig and Diga 1998). Accordingly, this 
study adopts an unweighted technique for 
scoring each fiscal policy disclosure item.  
In the disclosure index (FPCI), the 
contents of each annual report are compared to 
the items listed on a checklist and coded as 1 
or 0, depending upon whether or not the con-
tent conforms to the items listed on the check-
list (Coy, Tower and Dixon 1993). A fiscal 
policy disclosure index (FPCI) for every local 
government is then calculated as the ratio of 
total score awarded to the local government 
divided by the maximum number of items that 
are applicable for the entity. Such a measure-
ment approach is suitable for measuring the 
level of disclosure in developing nations 
whose set of economic, politic and social con-
ditions differ from those of developed nations 
(see Nurhayati, Brown and Tower 2006).  
FPCI consists of six items of informa-
tion relating to local governments fiscal poli-
cies. The items are adopted from the Indone-
sian government accounting standards (PP 
No.24 of 2005) that seek to communicate fis-
cal policy information in every local govern-
ment. These items include information on 
revenue policy, expenditure policy, resource 
costs and usage, and comparison with previ-
ous periods of financial circumstances. The 
items can be used as an important benchmark 
to analyze how far local governments commu-
nicate their fiscal condition. Therefore, this 
study uses those six items of fiscal policy to 
assess the extent to which local governments 
provide an explanation of fiscal information in 
its financial statements. The initial analyses of 
 	
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the 80 Indonesia’s local government financial reports are reported in figure 1. 
Figure 1: Fiscal Policy Compliance Index (FPCI) in 2009 (by items) 
 
Legend: 
I-1 = information on financial condition compared to the previous period 
I-2 = information on financial condition compared to budget 
I-3 = information on financial condition compared to other plans related to the realization of budget 
I-4 = information on government policy regarding the increase of income 
I-5 = information on government policy regarding the efficiency on expense 
I-6 = information on the resources or the use of cost 
 
Key factors highlighted from Figure 1 are: 
• The average overall information on fiscal 
policy (FPCI) score during 2009 shows a 
high level of communication (81.2%). This 
indicates that Indonesian local governments 
are very concerned about fiscal policy in-
formation which occurs in their area such 
as changes in financial position, revenue 
increases, expenditure efficiency, and the 
resources or the use of cost. Information on 
the position and financial condition is the 
highest communicated (100%). Information 
on resources or the uses of cost are the 
lowest communicated (51%). 
• Two items in the FPCI, information on po-
sition and financial condition of the current 
period of fiscal compared to the previous 
one and position and financial condition of 
the current period of fiscal compared to a 
budget are communicated by all (100%). 
This indicates that Indonesian local gov-
ernments are very concerned about such in-
formation. The position of financial condi-
tion is compared with the previous year to 
determine changes, if there is a decline in 
quality between current and prior years, the 
improvement efforts can be made for fur-
ther year. This is in accordance with one of 
the qualitative characteristics of financial 
statements in which the financial state-
ments should be comparable (Schipper 
2003). 
• Information on government policies relat-
ing to increase of income is disclosed by 
71% of the Indonesian local government 
entities. This indicates that not all local 
governments transparently disclose such in-
formation or may not yet know (or have 
acquired) the things that are needed to dis-
close relating to the policy. 
• Information on government policies relat-
ing to the efficiency on expensed is com-
municated 67%. This indicates that not all 
local governments in Indonesia disclose 
their efficiency on expense in their finan-
cial statements. One possible reason is that 
some local governments still use the tradi-
tional budget system that tends to spend 
their budget rather than set aside the budget 
expenditure for future years.  
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• Information concerning the resources or the 
use of funds is only communicated by 51% 
of the entities. This indicates that numerous 
local governments are still not transparently 
providing information about revenue 
sources and its use in detail in their finan-
cial statements. 
 
Independent and Control Variables 
Size of local government can be measured by 
a variety of techniques. Size of council is 
measured by the number of local members in 
the parliament (e.g. Hix, 2004). This meas-
urement is supported by the statement “the 
greater number of local parliament members 
reflects the greater pressure on the local gov-
ernment executive” (Sotiropoulos 2008, 29). 
The location of entities whether they 
are located in Java or Non-Java is used as a 
proxy of the jurisdiction variable. It is meas-
ured by a dichotomous coding of Java (coded 
as 1) and Non-Java (coded as 0). The ameni-
ties and qualities of human resources in local 
governments located in Java are better than 
non-Java. Therefore, local governments which 
are located in Java potentially have better fis-
cal policy disclosure practices than Non-Java. 
In Indonesia, the chairman of a local 
government may be from a political party or a 
coalition of political parties. Independence of 
local parliament is measured by the proportion 
of local parliament members who are inde-
pendent of the executive (chairman of local 
government). Sloan (2011) argues that the 
greater proportion of the party that is inde-
pendent to the executive will potentially raise 
the level of disclosure in financial statements. 
The level of Human Development In-
dex (HDI) is used as control variable. HDI is a 
comparative measure of life expectancy, aver-
age education level and standards of living for 
countries worldwide. A score is separately ob-
tained for each jurisdiction in Indonesia. Local 
governments that have high HDI are expected 
to have better disclosure in their financial 
statements. This is because they receive 
greater pressure from the public (Nurhayati, 
Brown and Tower 2006).  
Type of local government is measured 
by a dichotomous coding of municipality 
(coded as 1) and district (coded as 0). Accord-
ing to UU No.22 of 1999, Indonesian local 
government structure is divided into munici-
pality (urban area) and district (rural area). 
Usman (2001) states that the type of local 
government usually reflects the economic de-
velopment level and infrastructure. This fo-
cuses on how the municipality interacts with 
the community. Hence, municipality govern-
ments may be motivated to be more transpar-
ent in preparing their financial statements.  
Age of an entity may affect the quality 
of its financial statements. The older the local 
government entity the likelihood of better 
quality because there has been a longer learn-
ing process (Lev and Schwartz 1971). The 
original number of local government entities 
in Indonesia before 1999 was 292, more re-
cently because of new local government 
autonomy acts, that number has substantially 
grown to 496. Age of entity is measured by 
the number of years from inception of the lo-
cal government. 
The number of audit finding concerns 
is derived from the findings based on five 
classifications, including; state losses, lack of 
acceptance, administration, inefficiency, and 
ineffectiveness (BPKRI, 2009). The total 
number of documented concerns is used to 
measure the audit findings variable. This 
measurement is previously used in Martani 
and Lestiani (2010).  
Surplus and deficit of a local govern-
ment is measured using a dichotomous scale. 
If government revenue is greater than expendi-
ture (surplus) then a score of 0 (zero) is given, 
whereas a score of 1 (one) is given if govern-
ment revenue is less than expenditure (deficit). 
This coding is previously used in Stalebrink 
(2007) when examining the extent of disclo-
sures in the financial statements of cities. 
Finally, financial independence is 
measured by ratio of Local Government Fi-
nancial Independence (RLGFI). According to 
Alicias et al. (2007) the local financial formula 
is calculated as the local government revenue 
divided local government revenue plus reve-
nue from state and province. 
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Table 2: Measurement Technique of the Independent and Control Variables 
 
Independent 
Variables 
Control 
Variables 
Measurement 
Type of 
Data 
Coercive isomor-
phism 
Size of local 
gov ernment  
Total number of local government parliamen-
tarians 
 
Continuous 
Mimetic isomor-
phism 
Jurisdiction  It is measured by dichotomous coding: 
 1 = if local government entity is located in 
Java 
0 = if local government entity is not located in 
Java 
Categorical 
Normative isomo
phism 
Political Influ-
ence 
 
 Proportion of non controlling parties in the 
local parliament 
Continuous 
 
  HDI 
 
Type of local 
government 
 
Age of entity 
 
Audit Finding 
 
Surplus/deficit  
of Local  
Government 
 
Financial inde-
pendence 
 Level of Human Developing Index (HDI) 
 
1 = Municipality 
0 = District 
 
Number of years from inception 
 
Number of audit finding recommendations 
 
1 = if deficit (revenue < expenditure) 
0 = if surplus (revenue > expenditure) 
 
 Local government revenue 
_____________________x 100% 
Local government revenue + Revenue  
from state/province 
 Continuous 
 
Categorical 
 
 
Continuous 
 
Continuous 
 
Categorical 
 
 
 
Continuous 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Descriptive Results and FPCI Analysis 
  
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of the Dependent, Independent and Control Variables 
Variable n 
Min 
(%) 
Max 
(%) 
Mean 
(%) 
Median 
(%) 
Std Dev 
(%) 
Fiscal Policy Compliance Index (FPCI) 
 80 51 100 81.2 84.5  21.01 
Number of Parliamentarians
 
 80 20 50 39 42  9.50 
Human Development Index (HDI) 
 
 80 61.27 81.94 72 72.20  3.60 
Non Supporting Parties
 
 80 28.60 96 67 66.70 13.80 
Age of Local Government
 
 80 3 1328 278 158 333 
Audit Finding
 
 80 8 47 23 22.51 7.60 
Financial Independence
 
80 1 30 9.60 8 5.90 
 Legend: Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics of dependent variable (FPCI) and continuous predictor variables 
 Whereas the composition of categorical variables consist of 17.5% (deficit entities) and 82.5% (surplus entities), 
 50% (Java) and 50% (Non-Java), 50% (district) and 50% (municipality). 
 
Table 3 shows that the average of Fis-
cal Policy Compliance Index (FPCI) level for 
the 80 Indonesian local governments is 81.2%. 
This finding suggests that overall fiscal policy 
disclosure practices of Indonesian local gov-
ernments are high. The number of local par-
liament members in the 80 local governments 
range from 20 to 50 persons with the mean of 
39 persons. This is in accordance with the 
regulation of Indonesian electoral commission 
No. 17 of 2008 that the number of local par-
liament members shall be at least 20 seats and 
at most 50 seats. The Human Development 
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Index (HDI) scores for Indonesian local gov-
ernments are quite varied.  
The minimum score of the HDI for the 
80 local governments is 61.27% (West Lom-
bok, Java non-district) and the maximum 
score is 81.94% (Tasikmalaya, Java-district) 
with the average value of all local govern-
ments being 72%. The proportion of minority 
parties in each local parliament also has a 
wide range whith the lowest proportion being 
Cilegon (Java-municipality) with 28%, while 
the highest is Cimahi (Java-municipality) with 
96%. Interestingly, local governments in In-
donesia have greatly varying ages. The newest 
local government is the 3 years old Bengkulu 
Tengah (Non Java-district), while Palembang 
(Non Java-municipality ) is the oldest that has 
been in existence for over a millennium being 
1327 years. The local government having the 
lowest number of audit finding is Sleman 
(Java-district) with 8 findings, whereas the 
largest number of audit finding is Cianjur 
(Java-district) with 47 findings. Finally, the 
minimum value of financial independence 
variable is 1 (Bengkulu Tengah, Non Java-
district), and the highest is 30, the average 
value is 9.60 (Surabaya, Java-municipality). 
Table 4 shows significant statistical 
differences for several predictor variables in-
clude Number of Parliamentarians, Human 
Development Index, Non-Supporting Parties, 
Age of Local Government, Audit Finding, and 
Financial Independence between Java and 
Non Java local governments, district-
municipality, and surplus-deficit local gov-
ernments. There are three variables that are 
high statistically significantly different be-
tween Java and Non-Java local governments 
such as Number of Parliamentarians (p-
value=0.001), Financial Independence (p-
value=0.001) and Audit Finding (p-
value=0.003). In addition, two other variables 
are statistically significantly different, these 
are the Human Development Index (p-
value=0.017) and Audit Finding (p-
value=0.021). There is one variable that is not 
significantly different between Java and Non 
Java local governments, that variable is Non 
Supporting Parties. This finding notes no dif-
ference between minority parties in Java and 
Non Java. 
Furthermore, variables of Human Develop-
ment Index and Financial Independence be-
tween Indonesian municipalities and districts 
are high statistically significantly different (p-
value=0.000). These results indicate that both 
variables are likely strongly influenced by 
geographic position of local governments, 
which are located in municipalities or districts. 
There are no significantly different findings 
for other variables.  
Table 4 also generates the results of 
univariate tests associated with all predictor 
variables categorized based on local govern-
ment budget surpluses and deficits. The statis-
tical analysis shows that audit finding and fi-
nancial independence between budget surplus 
and deficit local governments have statisti-
cally significant differences (p-value=0.012 
and 0.023). Both variables are influenced by 
the condition of local government budget. 
 
Table 4: Univariate Analysis Results: Anova and T-Test 
Variable Java-Non Java 
District-
Municipality 
Surplus-Deficit 
Number of Parliamentarians .001***  .428  .579 
Human Development Index (HDI)  .017** .000***  .352 
Non Supporting Parties  .585  .794  .988 
Age of Local Government  .021**  .288  .524 
Audit Finding  .003***  .377 .012** 
Financial Independence (a)  .001***  .000***  .023** 
***highly significant at 1% level,  **significant at 5% level, *moderately significant at 10% level.  
Legend: (a) financial independence variable consist of 66 deficit entities + 14 surplus entities 
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Table 5: ANOVA Analysis by Category Jurisdictions in Indonesia 
Variable 
HDI 
(%) 
Age 
(years) 
NumPar 
(#) 
Audfind 
(#) 
Indepcy 
(#) 
Nonsup 
(%) 
Java Districts 72.2 368 46 20 8.9 67.5 
Non Java Districts 69.3 109 33 23 4.0 67.9 
Java Municipality 75.1 359 36 20 14.8 68.8 
Non Java Municipality 74.1 277 38 27 10.8 65.0 
Average 72.7 278 38 22 9.6 67.3 
Min 61.2 3.0 20 8 1.0 28.6 
Max 81.9 1327 50 47 30.0 96.0 
Sig (p-values) 
0.000*** .047** 0.000*** 0.010** 0.000* 0.850 
F 14.873 2.777 9.015 4.012 19.926 0.265 
***highly significant at 1% level,  **significant at 5% level, *moderately significant at 10% level.  
Legend: HDI=Human Development Index; Age=Age of local government; Numpar=Number of parliamentarians; 
Audfind=Audit finding; Indepcy=Financial Independence; Nonsup=Non supporting parties  
 
Table 5 shows quite interesting infor-
mation regarding the predictor variables asso-
ciated with the condition of the four local gov-
ernment jurisdictions in Indonesia (1) Java 
District, (2) Non Java District, (3) Java Mu-
nicipality, (4) Non Java Municipality. The ta-
ble highlights highly significant differences by 
the types of their jurisdiction, namely Java dis-
trict, Non-Java district, Java municipality, and 
Non-Java municipality. The statistical differ-
ences include the HDI quality of life measure 
(p-value=0.000), number of elected official in 
the local area (p-value= 0.000), financial inde-
pendence of the local government (p-
value=0.000) and number of critical audit 
findings (p-value=0.010). Moreover, it can be 
seen that age of local government is also sig-
nificantly different (p-value=0.047). Only the 
non-supporting parties variable is not signifi-
cantly different (p-value=0.850). 
 
Regression Analysis 
To test the three hypotheses, a series of back-
ward regression are performed
4
. In such a re-
gression, all predictor variables are entered 
into a model and sequentially removed until 
only significant variables remain with the 
                                                 
4
  Classical assumptions of multiple regression (multicollin-
earity, normality, linearity, outliers, and homoscedasticity) 
have been checked with the conclusion that all of the as-
sumptions were met (see Hair, Anderson, Tatham & Black, 
1988). 
maximum explanatory power (Cooper and 
Schindler 2006). 
Table 6 multiple regression results 
shows that number of parliamentarians (coer-
cive variable) influences the Indonesia Fiscal 
Policy Compliance Index (FPCI). This vari-
able is statistically significant (p-value 0.018). 
Furthermore, the value of adjusted R-square is 
24.9%. There are two control variables which 
are statistically significant, they are age of lo-
cal government (p-value=0.025) and financial 
independence (p-value=0.022). The coeffi-
cient of the three variables are positive, sup-
porting the argument presented in prior section 
which posits that there are positive associa-
tions between fiscal policy mandatory disclo-
sure practices and the size of local government 
as represented by the number of parliamen-
tarians (Hypothesis 1), age of local govern-
ment (control variable) and financial inde-
pendence (control variable). However, the 
other hypotheses variables such as Java and 
Non Java (Hypothesis 2), non-supporting par-
ties (Hypothesis 3) and control variables 
(HDI, audit finding, municipality-district, and 
surplus-deficit) are not statistically significant 
and therefore they are considered unable to 
explain the variation of fiscal policy disclosure 
practices in Indonesian local governments. 
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Table 6: Result of Backward Regression 
Variables 
Variable 
Types 
Predicted Sign Coefficient P-Value 
(Constant)   .462 .000 
Number of Parliamentarians  IV + .002 .018** 
Age of local government  CV + .000 .025** 
Financial independence  CV + .004 .022** 
Adjusted R
2
 : .249   
F-Stat : 9.740   
Sig. : .000   
Legend: IV=Independent Variable; CV=Control Variable 
**highly significant at 1% level,  **significant at 5% level, *moderately significant at 10% level. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
The research presented in this paper focuses 
on an empirical analysis of the veracity of 
isomorphic institutional theory to predict the 
level of fiscal policy mandatory disclosure 
practices in Indonesia local governments. An 
Indonesian Fiscal Policy Compliance Index 
(FPCI) checklist is created with key predictor 
variables (size of local parliament, Java-Non 
Java, and non supporting parties) tested to ex-
plain the extent of such communication in 
2009. 
In summary, from the three isomorphic 
components including coercive, mimetic, and 
normative, only the coercive component has a 
significant effect on the extent of fiscal policy 
disclosure (number of parliamentarians). This 
generates evidence that in Indonesia, coercive 
pressure is still needed to improve transpar-
ency. This is consistent with Graham and 
Woods (2006) argument that coercive pressure 
is effective in developing countries. 
Local parliament is often very con-
cerned about fiscal policy of local govern-
ments. Dillon (2002) states that Local parlia-
ment has a strategic role in alleviation pro-
gram of Indonesia's poverty through estab-
lishment of regional regulation relating to fis-
cal policy. In Indonesia, poverty reduction ar-
guably has sufficient funds from their local 
budgets because it is fully supported by the 
local parliament. Therefore, the local parlia-
ment is very concerned about information of 
fiscal policy in the financial statements of lo-
cal governments. Furthermore, Kartiwa (2009) 
states that one of local parliament functions is 
to formulate development policies and to plan 
development programs in the region including 
fiscal policy. The findings in this study reveal 
that the local parliament generates pressure 
(coercive pressure) on the local government to 
disclose fiscal policy information in its finan-
cial statement. 
In addition, age of local government 
affects the extent of fiscal policy disclosure in 
Indonesian local governments. This finding 
supports Lev and
 
Schwartz (1971) statement 
that the older the age of the entity leads to the 
likelihood of better quality because there has 
already been a long learning process. Finally, 
financial independence also influences the ex-
tent of fiscal policy disclosure. The higher the 
level of financial dependence, the more exten-
sive disclosure of fiscal policies of local gov-
ernment financial reports. This is probably 
because the central government as the sup-
porter of funds will ask for more detailed ex-
planations from local governments which have 
higher levels of financial dependence as an 
evaluation tool in the following years. Thus, 
the local governments with higher financial 
dependence tend to be more expansive in dis-
closing fiscal policy information in their fi-
nancial statements. This finding in line with 
Rajan and Zingales (1996) statement that or-
ganizations with high financial dependence 
tend to be more open in their financial ac-
countability. 
Furthermore, a key finding in this re-
search is that the Indonesian overall level of 
communication as measured by the FPCI 
score is 81.2%. Arguably, this is a good level 
of transparency. Several items are communi-
 	
 
26 
cated very well by Indonesian local govern-
ments (above 90% even up to 100%). Never-
theless the government should try to enhance 
the level of fiscal policy disclosure, particu-
larly information relating to their resources 
and costs (51%), information on government 
policy regarding the efficiency on expenses 
(67%), and information on government policy 
regarding increases in income (71%). 
Transparency can be improved when 
there are clarity of tasks and authority, avail-
ability of information to public, open budget-
ing process, and guarantees of integrity re-
garding fiscal forecasts, information, and suf-
ficient detail (Campo and Tomasi 1999). 
Therefore, the government should continue 
their efforts to improve transparency in local 
government as one important aspect of public 
governance in Indonesia.  


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